









necessary correction in the level ofthe
money stock is now largely complete.
Inflation and the goods markets
Monetarytheory predicts thatchanges in the
growth rate ofmoney will lead to changes
in the growth rate oftotal spending in the
economy and hence ofnominal GNP. Both
theory and empirical evidence suggest that
in the short run such changes in the growth
rate ofspending mainlytake the form of
variations in the rate ofreal growth, but that
in the long run, they appear largely in the
form ofchanges in the inflation rate. The
Federal Reserve relied on the latter relation-
ship between money and prices when it set
out to reduce inflation by slowing the rate
ofmonetary growth in stages over a number
ofyears.
The expected outcome of lowerinflation
ultimately materialized. Whatsurprised
economists and policymakers alike was the
suddenness ofthe inflation slowdown. In the
first six monthsof 1982, consumer prices
increased at an annual rate ofonly five
percent-sharplylowerthan the 7.4percent
inflation rate in the second halfof1981-
and this deceleration of inflation continued
in the second halfof 1982 and into 1983. In
the first five monthsof 1983, prices rose at
an annual rate ofless than three percent.
When the prices ofgoods and services are
rising rapidly, both households and busi-
nesses have an incentive to buy now rather
than later when prices will be higher. The
extreme example ofthis phenomenon is the
"flightfrom the currency" which occurs
during hyperinflations. By the same token, a
reduction in the rate ofinflation creates an
incentiveto delayspendingdecisions. Ifthis
tendency is notoffsetbyareduction in nom-
inal ormarket interest rates, itwill have a
contractionary eff\"ct on the economy.
Putdifferently, adecrease in the inflation
rate, to the extentthat it lowers expectations
The dramaticand unexpected slowing in the
rateofinflation in 1982 had the dual effectof
keeping real interest rates high and the real
economy depressed. In this Letter, I shall
review the interaction ofmoney, inflation,
and interest rates. I will argue that the
Federal Reserve took appropriate counter-
vailing action in mid-1982 when itsharply
increased the stock ofmoney butthat the
To illustrate this point, consider the follow-
ing example. The Administration has set a
target for annual growth in real GNP offour
percent over the nextfive years. To achieve
this target, total spending would have to
growat a rate sufficientto absorb the dollar
valueofthis increase in the nation's output.
Allowing for inflation, annual spending
growth would have to be limited to the four
percent growth in output plus the rise in
prices-to around ninepercent, in other
words, ifinflation were notto rise above
recent levels. Ifmoney'svelocity-the
speed with which itcirculates-did not
change, spending growth ofnine percent
would require an equal growth in the stock
ofmoney. Overmostofthe postwar period,
however, the velocity ofmoney has tended
to rise steadily. Although this upward trend
was interrupted in 1982, I shall argue that
the interruption probablydoes notrepresent
apermanentchange in the trend. Hence, the
growth in money necessarytosustain anine
percent rate ofgrowth in spending is likelyto
be less than nine percent. Fourteen percent
money growth on asustained basis, there-
fore, is almost certainly notthe prescripti09
for further reductions in the inflation rate.
From July 1982 to June 1983, the stock of
money (measured by M 1) increased at an
annual rate of 14 percent. Clearly, such a
high rate ofmonetary expansion sustained
indefinitely would notbe compatible with
stable prices, or even with the 4-5 percent
inflation we have been observing in the last
twelve months.
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offuture inflation, implies an increase in the
real rate of interest as long as nominal rates
do not change. Higher real interest rates
encourage households to save more at the
same time as they discourage businesses
from undertaking new investment projects.
As a resu It, the aggregate demand for goods
and services declines.
As pointed outabove, in theearly monthsof
1982, we saw just such asloWing in the rate
ofinflation.Atthesametime, nominal inter-
est rates rose slightly so that real interest
rates also rose. This would be expected to
contract aggregate demand and, in fact, that
is what happened. As a result, the recession
that started in 1981 lasted longer than most
economists had predicted. Instead ofbeinga
yearofrecovery, 1982 was one in which
unemployment rose steadily to its highest
rate since 1940.
Inflation andthedemand for money
A decline in the rate of inflation reduces the
differential between real and nominal inter-
est rates (the differential being equal to the
expected inflation rate). As pointed out
above, economists generally take it for
granted that the demand for goods and ser-
vices responds to the real rate; they argue
that savers are concerned with the real re-
turn on theirsavings ratherthan thenominal
return and that investorspayattentionto real
costs and real returns when planningcapital
investment projects. This means that when
the inflation rate comes down, the nominal
rate must declinecorrespondingly ifreal
aggregate demand is to be maintained.
Such adecline in the nominal rate will
increase the public's demand for money
because thatdemanddependson the oppor-
tunitycost ofholding moneywhich is rep-
resented by the nominal interest rate. Thus,
to avoid adeclinein the levelsofoutputand
employment when the inflation rate slows
down,the level ofthe public's aggregate
holdingsofmoney must be increased to
meet the increased demand. Ifthis is not
done,nominal interest rates will notdecline,
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real rates wiII rise and output and employ-
mentwill fall. But raising the level ofthe
public's money holdings requires that the
growth in money temporarily rise in order
to accommodate the increased demand
to hold it.
To prevent the resurgence ofinflationary
expectations, the Federal Reserve must
make it clearthat this temporary burst of
monetary expansion represents a "level
adjuslment" tothe higherdemand for
moneyand not a permanent increase in the
moneygrowth rate thatwould ultimately
lead to higher inflation. Clearly, once the
adjustment in the level ofmoney holdings
has been made, the growth in money must
revertto the lowerrate that is consistentwith
the lower rate ofinflation.
In thewakeofthe inflation slowdown
In July 1982, the monetary growth rate in-
creased sharply and nominal interest rates
fell rapidly. Moneygrowth continued high
intothe fall of 1982 and early 1983 as the
public adjusted its demand for money to the
lower interest rates and also to the rise in
their incomes as the economy began to
revive. At that time, it was argued that this
increase in thestockofmoneyresulted from
greateruncertainties in the economy that
had increased the precautionarydemand for
money. Evidence developed atthis Bank,
however, suggests thatthe rapid money
growthduringthis period was no greater
than the rise in income and the earlierde-
cline in short-term interest rates would have
led us to expect. That is, empirically esti-
mated moneydemand functions fitthe data
ofthis period quite well. This evidence also
suggests that earlierfears that the introduc-
tion ofinterest-bearing checking accounts
(Super-NOWs) in 1983 would cause the
demand for money function to become
unstable were, apparently, notrealized.
We can, therefore, conclude that the rapid
growthofmoneysinceJuly 1982 represents
a necessary upward adjustment in the level
ofthe moneystock. This adjustmentwasrequired to permitnominal interest rates to
fall to a level consistent with the slower rate
ofinflation. As such, it is not inflationary
because the money is being willingly held
bythepublicat lowernominal interestrates.
Indeed, ifthe Federal Reserve had not in-
creased the stock ofmoney as the inflation
rate came down, real interest rates would
have been higher and the economy signifi-
cantlyweaker.
This does not mean that itwould be appro-
priate nowto continue to allow money to
grow rapidly. A temporary increase in the
rate ofmoney growth is an appropriate way
ofadjusting the level ofmoney balances to
the reduction in nominal interest rates made




not, however, aviable long-term strategy
because it leads to inflation in the long run.
As the accompanying chart illustrates, the
level ofreal money balances in dollarsof
constant purchasing power is now approxi-
mately backto its previous peak level,
reached five years ago. This strongly sug-
gests thatmuch ofthe adjustmenttothe level
ofthe money stock is nowcomplete.
Forthefuture, sustained real growth without
the re-emergence ofrapid inflation requires
nominal M1 growth well below the rates
experienced since last July. Ultimately,
this growth must be brought down to lower
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Selected Assets and Liabilities .
largeCommercial Banks
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)
o ar ercen
loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 162,123 - 82 938 0.6
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 140,923 164 420 0.3
Commercial and industrial 43,870 - 62 - 176 - 0.4
Real estate 56,179 56 - 1,263 - 2.2
Loans to individuals 24,000 56 651 2.8
Securities loans 2,410 - 94 - 313 - 11.5
U.s. Treasury securities* 8,192 - 200 1,551 23.4
Othersecurities* 13,007 - 46 - 1,033 - 7.4
Demand deposits - total# 40,980 - 953 2,071 5.3
Demanddeposits - adjusted 28,614 -1,884 1,649 6.1
Savingsdeposits - totalt 66,512 - 281 35,891 117.2
Time deposits - total# 65,573 50 - 34,046 - 34.2
Individuals, part. & corp. 59,911 125 - 30,109 - 33.4
(large negotiableCD's) 18,582 - 330 - 19,258 - 50.9
WeeklyAverages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings






* Excludes trading accountsecurities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t IndudesMoney Market DepositAccounts, Super~NOWaccounts, and NOW accounts.
Editorial commentsmay beaddressed totheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....Freecopies of
this and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling orwriting the Public Informa~
tionSection, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415)
974-2246.